Abstract-We consider the scenario where multiple users send information to a single receiver over a common channel. Each user is aware of only his channel fading state and has statistical knowledge of the fading process of the other users. The fading process of each user is modeled as ergodic finite state Markov chains. We consider two problems. The first problem is the noncooperative game where the receiver decodes the the message of each transmitter by considering the signals of the other users as noise. In the second problem, the receiver employs a successive interference decoder to decode the messages of the users. The two problems are posed as stochastic games, the first one as a non-cooperative game where the aim is to maximize the expected time average throughput of each user in a selfish manner. In the second problem, the aim is maximize the expected time average sum throughput of the system. We show the existence of Nash equilibrium policies for both the games and give a best response algorithm to find them for both the games. Our analysis begins first by showing that the second game is the potential game of the first one, hence the equilibria policies for both the games are same. We then analyze the first game at large but finite number of users. We show there exist a natural number such that when the number of users exceed this number, then the equilibrium policies are unique. Furthermore the equilibrium policies of the users are invariant as long as the number of users remain above the latter threshold. These policies are then shown to achieve the global maximum of the expected time average sum throughput of the second game. We give a algorithm which is linear in number of users to compute these threshold equilibrium policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Multiple access channel (MAC) is a abstract model of the scenario where more than one transmitter simultaneously sends information to a single receiver. In the wireless setup, the time varying fading process and knowledge of channel state information affects the throughput of the users. Resources such as power, time and rate have to be dynamically allocated to improve the throughput of the users. In general, this problem can be approached in two ways, a centralized scheme or a distributed scheme. The centralized scheme provides the best possible throughputs for each transmitter while requiring a huge overhead. On the other hand a distributed implementation provides the flexibility required for a practical system, but gives less throughput in comparison to the former. In this work we adopt a game theoretic approach to analyze the above problem. This approach is a distributed scheme and here the users are modeled as rational and selfish players interested in maximizing their utilities.
Another problem considered in the distributed approach is the availability of each users channel statistics across other users. A centralized approach assumes that all such information is available to every user at each time instant. On the other hand, a distributed scheme may or may not include such assumptions and hence vary from users having complete channel state information of other users to knowing only channel statistics of other users. These assumptions significantly affect system modeling as well as the throughputs achieved by various users in the system. We now provide a brief survey on the related works.
The centralized problem where each user's transmitter and receiver knows every other users channel state was considered in [1] , here the authors considered the problem of finding resource allocation schemes which are information theoretically optimal. The authors of [1] considered the problem finding all possible achievable rates of all users under fixed average power constraints. This set of achievable rates was shown to be a polymatroid and using results in [2] , the authors showed that the solution of any rate and power allocation schemes over this set can be computed in polynomial time by using a greedy algorithm. In particular they showed the scheme of assigning the channel to the user with the highest channel gain maximizes the ergodic sum capacity. [4] considered the same problem in a game theoretic setup. They assumed full channel state information of each user is available to every user and showed that when each user maximizes his own rate in a selfish manner, while treating the other user signal as interference, assigning the channel to the user with the highest channel gain is a Nash equilibrium. The work in [5] , [6] considered the problem where each user maximized his/her mutual information in a selfish manner and provided sufficient conditions for the existence of unique Nash equilibrium. Here also the authors assumed that each user had access of channel gain of every other user.
The work in [7] formulated the above problem in a Bayesian scenario, that is each user is only aware of his/her channel gain and has statistical knowledge of the channel gains of the other user. They showed there exist a unique Nash equilibrium. In this model, the power policies was modeled as a continuous variable while the channel could only take values from a finite set. A similar setup in which the power was considered discrete was considered in [9] , [22] . In fact our model is similar to these papers. In [9] the authors showed the existence of Nash equilibria for the game where each user maximizes his/her own Shannon capacity while treating the other users as noise. An algorithm was provided for computing the equilibrium policies for two users while a best response algorithm is provided to compute any such equilibrium policy for any number of users. A proof was provided for the correctness of the two user algorithm while the best response algorithm was shown to converge only numerically. We note that a method of proving that the algorithm in [9] converges was provided in [22] . We provide the whole proof for convergence of the algorithm in our work.
We note that in all of these models the number of users was fixed and algorithms were provided to compute or converge to point of interest. However as the number of users increases, the algorithms provided above become computationally infeasible. To overcome this problem new models where the number of users can be very large have become quite popular in literature [12] , [13] . In these models the numbers of agents are significantly large, such that, each user can be modeled as a rational agent playing against a continuum of agents. The infinite interaction between the users is now captured by means of a parameter called the mean field. Each user is now modeled to interact with other users only through the mean field. This modeling assumption significantly reduces the complexity by converting the large user problem into a simpler optimization problem. However in many cases the equilibria policies arising from this type of modeling becomes solution to difficult forward -backward partial differential equations. In general, only solutions from numerical algorithms can be given for such problems. It is to be noted, that in all mean field models an assumption of symmetric agents is assumed, that is the players in these type of games are interchangeable. [12] , [13] . In the wireless context such modeling has been considered in [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] . However we focus specifically on [19] , as this model is similar to the one we consider. In this model, each user maximizes his/her own signal to interference and noise ratio where the signal from the other users is treated as noise. The authors show that as number of users tend towards infinity, the problem can be analyzed via a mean field setup. Interestingly they show via numerical simulations that the optimal equilibria policy at large number of users outperforms any well known equilibrium policy. We prove a similar result in our work.
In this paper, we study the model where the receiver knows the channel states of all the users, while each transmitter only knows her/his channel state information. We assume that the each user is aware of channel statistics of the other users. We consider two scenarios, one where the receiver uses a standard matched filter decoder and in the other one, the receiver employs a successive interference decoder. In the first scenario while decoding the signal of a user, the receiver treats the message of other users as noise. Here each user selfishly maximizes his/her own Shannon capacity. In the second scenario a prespecified ordering of the users is made available to each transmitter and here each user maximizes the multiple access channel sum rate. We assume that the channel gain as well as the feasible power levels are finite. Our results are as follows.
1) In both scenarios we show the existence of Nash equilibria and prove the convergence of the best response algorithm given in [9] , [11] . We also show that the utility function of the second problem is the potential function [21] corresponding to the utilities of the first one. Hence we need to analyze only one of the problem. Henceforth we analyze the first scenario only. 2) We then consider the case as the numbers of users becomes large under the assumption of finite sets of symmetric users. This assumption implies that all users belonging to a particular set are interchangeable and there are only finite number of such sets. We prove that there exist a finite threshold number of users beyond which the Nash equilibrium of each user in each set is unique and invariant. We refer to this policy as a infinitely invariant policy. Hence as long as the number of users remains greater than this threshold, the Nash equilibrium policy of each user in the system does not change. This implies we need to compute the equilibria policies only for a finite number of users using the best response algorithm. We also show that under this assumption the best response algorithm has linear complexity in number of users. 3) We then show at sufficiently large number of users, the equilibrium policy is a strictly dominating policy among the set of all rational policies of each user. from this result, we derive as a corollary that at sufficiently large number of users, in the scenario where each user knows only his, her channel gain , the infinitely invariant policy is the optimal policy which maximizes the ergodic sum rate capacity of the MAC channel. 4) We then provide a sequence of optimization problems which computes the infinitely invariant policy. We show that this policy maximizes time average snr of the user and then minimizes the variance of the time average snr. By using structural results from Markov decision theory, we show that this policy arises from a greedy algorithm which has linear complexity in number of channel states as well as number of power levels. Our paper is structured as follows. The system model and problem formulation along with the various required definitions are provided in section II and section III respectively. We then provide the existence of Nash equilibria and best response algorithm used to compute them in section IV. Section V considers the case when interference is very large. This is an intermediate step in the analysis of the games at large number of users. Here we provide the algorithm used in the computation of the infinitely invariant policy. In section VI we consider the scenario where the numbers of users is very large and show the existence of a infinitely invariant policy in section VII. In section VIII we provide numerical results verifying the same.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a discrete time scenario involving the multiaccess fading channel where a set N = {1, 2, 3, · · · , N } of users access a base-station simultaneously over each time-slot. The fading channel observed by user i at time n is modeled as an finite state ergodic Markov chain h i [n] which takes values from a finite set H i . The results in this work remain the same for any stationary and ergodic fading process. Any element of this set is denoted as h i . The set of channel states of all users is denoted as H = i∈N H i and h := (h i , h 2 , · · · , h N ) denotes any element of this set.
The transition probability of user i going from channel h
of users are assumed to be processes independent of each other. We assume that the fading process of user i is known perfectly by both the user as well as the base-station but is unknown to the other users. We denote the row vector π i := (π i (h i ) : h i ∈ H i ) as the vector of steady state probabilities of user i corresponding to the Markov chain h i [n]. At each time n user i invests power p i [n] from the finite set P i . Any element of this set is denoted as p i . It is assumed that sometimes the user will not transmit, hence the action p i = 0 belongs to the set of power P i of user i. The set of power action of all users is denoted as P = i∈N P i and p := (p i , p 2 , · · · , p n ) denotes any element of this set.
We assume that the base station has complete information about the power level p i [n] utilized by each user i for every time-slot n. On the other hand, users other than user i only know the set of channel states H i , power levels P i of user i. We also assume that users other than user i know perfectly the channel statistics of user i. is to be noted that, this allows users other than user i to compute the steady state probabilities π i of user i.
We associate with each user i, a real valued function t i which signifies the reward t i (h, p) of user i when the the channel states and power actions of all the users are h and p respectively. It is assumed that this utility/reward function is known to all users as well as the base-station. In this work we consider the following reward functions.
1) The base-station employs a regular matched filter to decode the message of a user by considering the signals from other user as noise. In such a case a upper-bound for the maximum rate, user i can achieve when the the channel states and power actions of all the users are h and p is,
2) The base-station uses a successive interference cancellation filter. Given an ordering scheme on the the set of users N , the received packet of a user i is decoded after canceling out the decoded transmission of other users lying below user i in the predefined order from the received transmission. We assume perfect cancellation of the decoded signal from the received transmission known to all users at each time slot. If the users want to maximize the aggregated throughput in a decentralized manner, then the utility function of each user is,
It is to be noted that the objective function here is the same for all users.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the game theoretic problem arising from the system model and the two reward functions. We do so by first considering the class of stationary policies. It is to be noted that, this problem is going to be analyzed a constrained Markov game with independent state information. The interested reader can refer to [11] for motivation about the forthcoming definitions.
A. Stationary policies:
Let M(G) denote the set of probability measures over a set G. A stationary policy for user i is a function u i :
represents the probability of user i using power p i when her/his channel state is h i . We denote the set of stationary policies for user i as U i .
B. User and Order Notations:
Given a set G i associated with user i we refer to an element of the set as g i . The global set of all such elements of all users is defined as the Cartesian product of these sets and is
The set of all elements other than the element of user i is the Cartesian product of these sets other than the set G i associated with user i and is denoted as G −i = N j=1,j =i G j . Any element of this set is denoted as
Given any set G we denote |G| as the cardinality of set G. We use capital letters to denote any random variable or matrix occurring in this work. It will be clear from context, whether the occurring notation in capital letter is a matrix or a random variable. We denote R, N and Z as the set of real numbers, natural numbers and integers respectively. The set Z + denotes the set of strictly positive natural numbers. Let f (·) and g(·) denote two functions on the set of natural numbers. If the function f is asymptotically bounded above (below) the function, we denote it as,
C. Expected time-average reward and cost:
Let β i represent a initial probability distribution on the set of states H i of user i and β := (β i , β 2 , · · · , β N ) represent the initial joint probability distribution of all users on the global set of states H. Given a multi-policy u for all players, we can define a probability measure λ β u which determines the distribution of the stochastic process (h[n], p[n]) of states and actions. The expectation due to this distribution is denoted as E β u . We define the time-average expected rate T i (u) of user i as a function of the multi-policy u of all users. It is calculated as
Similarly let λ βi u denote the probability measure with respect (w.r.t) to the policy u i of user i and E ui denotes the expectation due to this distribution. The time average expected power P i (u i ) used by user i is now calculated as
D. Game Theoretic formulation
Let P i denote a constraint on the time average expected power of user i. A policy u i is called i−feasible if it satisfies P i (u i ) ≤ P i . A multi-policy u is called feasible if it is ifeasible for all users i ∈ N. User i chooses a i-feasible policy so as to maximize his reward T i (u i , u −i ). However T i (u) depends on the stationary policy of other users also leading to a non-cooperative game.
Let [u −i , v i ] denote the multi-policy where, users k = i use stationary policy u k while user i uses policy v i . We now define the Constrained Nash Equilibrium (CNE).
We denote the above formulation as a constrained Markov game (CMG) [11] ,
A CMG is called an identical interest CMG if the immediate reward function t i is same for all user. The games Γ n and Γ s represent the Markov games when the reward function for user i are t n i and t s i respectively. In the next two subsections we illustrate how to compute the best response sets associated with this game.
E. Calculation of Optimal response
Given the stationary policy u i , we define the occupation measure z i (h i , p i ) of user i for each channel-power pair
The occupation measure z i (h i , p i ) for user i is the steadystate probability of the user being in state h i and using power p i . Define the immediate reward for user i, when user i has channel h i and employs power p i and other users use multipolicy u −i as,
Then the time-average expected reward of user i under the multi-policy u are:
Similarly the time-average expected power of user i is
As we can compute occupation measures from stationary policies and conversely using (6), we restrict ourselves, in this work to finding occupation measures. Hence from now on, without loss of generality, we denote time-average expected reward and time-average expected power of user i as T i (u) := T i (z) and P i (u i ) := P i (z i ). We also use the term occupation measure and stationary policy interchangeably, even though from now on, we will only be computing the occupation measures z i of each user i.
F. Best response of player i
Let all users other than user i use the multi-policy u −i . Then user i has an optimal stationary best response policy which is independent of the initial state x 0 [11] . Let the set of optimal stationary policies of user i be denoted as B i (z −i ). We can compute the elements of this set from the following Linear program. Find z * i ∈ Z i that satisfies,
where the polyhedron Z i associated with user i is represented as,
We note that Z i is the set of all occupation measures of user i corresponding to i-feasible stationary policies. The set of all occupation measures of all users is represented as Z := i∈N Z i . We denote E(Z i ) as the set of extreme points/vertices of the polyhedron Z i . It is to noted that, the set of occupation measures Z i of each user i is nonempty as the policy of never transmitting satisfies all the constraints describing the polyhedron Z i .
IV. EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we show how to compute a constrained Nash equilibrium for these games. The existence of equilibria for these games was shown in theorem 2.1, [11] under the assumption that the Markov process resulting from policy of each user is irreducible and has a single ergodic class. As in our models the policy does not affect the Markov chain transition probability, under the assumption of ergodicity of the channel state process, the result follows. The existence of equilibria for the game Γ c was also shown in theorem 2, [9] .
We state and prove the convergence of the best response algorithm proposed in [9] used to compute the equilibrium policies for game Γ c . To show this result, we first extend the idea of potential games developed in [21] for normal form games to the constrained Markov games in this paper. We first state the definition of potential function and potential games for the games considered in this work. 
A. Potential games
The Markov game where each user use the expected time average rewardT is considered as the Markov potential game corresponding to the Markov game Γ.
It is to be noted that the expected time average rewardT for a Markov potential game is the same for all users, that is, a Markov potential game is an identical interest game. One can also observe from the above definition that the equilibria for the Markov potential game are the same as the equilibria for the corresponding Markov game. We now give a sufficient condition for for verifying whether there exist a potential function these Markov games. Proof: The proof of this theorem is a consequence of lemma 2.10 in [21] . Let us consider the Markov gameΓ, where user i has the immediate rewardt. In this case we the denote the immediate reward of user i, when when user i has channel h i and employs power p i and other users use multi-policy z −i asR z−i i . Also denoteT (z i , z −i ) as the time-average expected reward of each user for this game. The result (11) follows from expressions (12) , (7) and (8) .
The next result shows that the Markov game Γ s is the Markov potential game corresponding to the Markov game Γ n .
Theorem 2. Γ s is the Markov potential game of the Markov game Γ n .
Proof: The reader can verify the following identity,
The proof then follows from theorem 1.
As the equilibria policies of the Markov potential game and the corresponding Markov game are the same, following theorem 2, we can restrict our analysis to the Markov game Γ n . We now state the algorithm stated in [9] used to compute the equilibrium policies for a Markov game when it has a potential function. The algorithm is used to compute Epsilon constrained Nash equilibrium(ǫ-CNE) which we define below. 
Algorithm 1 Best Response Algorithm
5: The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix A. It is noted that the above theorem shows the existence of a CNE which are the vertices of the set of feasible occupation measures Z i for each user i. In particular, this implies the existence of CNE policies for games Γ s and Γ n which are vertices of the set of occupation measures. We also note that the ǫ− best response will find a CNE which are close to the vertices of feasible occupation measures.
It is to be noted that the best response algorithm only guarantees convergence to a CNE, however depending upon the ordering of users, the initial policy chosen for the algorithm may converge to different CNE if there exist multiple CNE's.
In the next subsection we analyze global maximizers of identical interest games.
B. Global Maximizer of Identical Interest Markov games
Definition 4. A multi-policy z * ∈ Z is the global maximizer of an identical interest Markov games Γ with time average reward T , if for any multi-policy z ∈ Z
We now state the result which shows there exist a global maximum, whose each single policy is a vertex of the polyhedron formed by the set of feasible occupation measures. Proof: As the function T (z) is continuous over a compact set Z, there exist a global maximum point z * ∈ Z. Now we prove there exist a pure policyẑ i ∈ Z i for each user i, such that T (ẑ) = T (z). We give the proof for two users which can be easily extended to N users. Letẑ i denote the best response policy of user i, which is a vertex of the polyhedron Z i , when user 2 plays policy z *
. Then we have T (ẑ
is also a global maximizer. Similarly we can findẑ 2 which is a vertex of the polyhedron Z 2 such that T (ẑ i ,ẑ 2 ) = T (ẑ i , z * 2 ), hence we have T (ẑ) = T (z * ) and each policy z * i corresponding to the multipolicy z * is a vertex of set of feasible occupation measure Z i for each user i.
We can easily show that the global maximum of an identical interest Markov game is a CNE. The above results shows that the game Γ s has a global maximizer and a CNE. In the next subsection, we define dominating policies for Markov games. 
C. Dominating Policies
The policy z
If the setẐ i = Z i in the above definition, the definition becomes the standard definition of a dominating policy. It also follows that if there exist a multi-policy z * of all users such that the policy z * i of user i is a dominating policy over the set of all feasible occupation measures Z i , then the multi-policy z * is a CNE. In case the policy z * i is a strictly dominating policy, the CNE is unique. This simple observation will be used to analyze games Γ n and Γ s at large number of users. To motivate the analysis of the games Γ n and Γ s at large number of users, we first understand how the expected time average maximizing policy of user i behaves in presence of a very large deterministic interference. This analysis in itself is interesting as well as provides intuition on the behavior of the previously mentioned Markov games at large number of users. The next section addresses this analysis.
V. TIME AVERAGE EXPECTED REWARD AT LARGE

INTERFERENCE
We consider in this section only one user. At each time slot n, the user i gets a one-step reward of
where I is the interference faced by the user and
is her/his channel state-power action pair. User i wants to maximize her/his time average expected reward, i.e maximize,
subject to
where β i is the initial distribution of player i and z i is the occupation measure corresponding to the stationary policy u i computed using (6). The optimal policy z i to the above optimization problem considered by user i is independent of the initial distribution β i and can be computed by the corresponding linear program LP (i, I). Find a policy z * i which maximizes
where
We denote S i (I) denote the set of solutions to the linear program LP (i, I). is to be noted that the set of solutions S i (I) is equal to the set of best response B i (z −i ) of user i in the Markov game Γ n when users other than user i use the policy where they do not transmit any data and the noise variance N 0 in the system is equal to 1 + I. In this section, we characterize the set of solutions S i (I) of the linear program LP (i, 1) at large interference. To do so, we first define the notion of the outer-limit of a sequence of sets.
Definition 6. We define the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I) of the sequence of sets S i (I) as the interference I tends towards infinity as,
The outer limit contains all policies of user i which belong to each set S i (I k ) of solutions for some sequence I k of interference which tends towards infinity as the index k tends towards infinity. The outer limit can be thought upon as the set of all infinitely often occurring optimal solutions of the linear programs LP (i, I) as the interference I tends toward to infinity. We show the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is a nonempty set in the next subsection.
A. Analysis as the interference I tends towards infinity.
At very large interference I, the function t i (h i , p i , I) can be approximated as h i p i [25] , [26] . By considering this approximation the objective function t i (z i , I) of the linear program can be approximated as,
We now consider the linear program (LP (1, 1)) induced by this approximation. Find a policy z * i which maximizes,
The set of solutions of this linear program is denoted by the set S Proof: We note that each value of the interference I, the linear program LP (I, i) always gives a solution which is a vertex of the polyhedron Z i . As the number of vertices of the polyhedron Z i is finite, we can find a subsequence {I m } such that a single vertex z i ∈ Z i is a subset of the set of solutions S i (I m ) for each integer m. Clearly z i lies in the set lim I→∞ S i (I). This proves that the set lim I→∞ S i (I) is nonempty.Let the policy z i lie in the set lim I→∞ S i (I). Hence there exists, a subsequence {I k } such that the policy z i lies in the set of solutions S i (I k ) for each integer k and lim k→∞ I k = ∞. Hence we have,
Hence, in the limit we have z i ∈ S 1 i . We note that in most cases the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is a strict subset of the set S 1 i of all 1− sensitive optimal solutions. In the next theorem we describe all the 1− sensitive optimal policies. We do so by first defining the following set of structural policies. Let us represent the set H i and P i as sets of strictly increasing positive real numbers, i.e.,
respectively. Then consider stationary policies z i of user i such that,
where α(·) is a probability distribution on the set P i which satisfies,
Let the set Q i denote the above class of policies. To understand, why the policies in this set are structured, we observe the following properties of policies in the set Q i .
1) The function
, is monotonically increasing function of the channel gain h This proof is also provided in appendix B. In general there exist infinite 1− sensitive optimal solutions. Only in the case when the power set P i = {0, p 1 i } is the solution unique. In this case the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is equal to the set S 1 i af all 1− sensitive optimal solutions. We next provide a algorithm which computes one of the policies of the set S 1 i .
Algorithm 2 Infinitely invariant Optimal Policy
for l = r : 0 do if
We will show in the next subsection that the policy generated by the algorithm 2 is the unique policy belonging to the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I).
B. Infinitely invariant Optimal Solution
In the previous subsection, we considered policies that belonged to the set S i (I) of solutions of the linear program LP (i, I) infinitely often as the interference tends to infinity. In this subsection, we consider policies that belong to every set S i (I) always after some finite value of interference I 0 . Definition 7. We define the inner-limit of the sets S i (I) as the interference I tends towards infinity as
where I 0 is some finite interference. We refer to any point z i belonging to the set lim I→∞ S i (I) as a infinitely invariant optimal solution. W The interference I 0 is called the threshold interference of user i.
If there exist a infinitely invariant optimal solution, then it can be shown that the inner limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is a subset of the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I). If both the sets are equal, then we say that the lim I→∞ S i (I) exists and define
We show the existence of an infinitely invariant optimal solution for the hypothetical case when the set of feasible solutions Z i has two vertices z Proof: We define the set K i (k i ) as the set of channelpower pair (h i , p i ) whose product is equal to the signal to unit noise variance (snr) k i , that is,
Let K i denote the set of possible distinct snr possible values. Suppose the policies z
We can now see in such a case, the expected time average reward t i (z 1 i , I) and t i (z 2 i , I) under the two policies are the same for any interference I. Therefore, we have the interference I = 0 as the interference threshold and the inner limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is equal to the set of feasible policies Z i for all interference I greater than zero. On the other hand suppose condition (20) does not hold true, then we will show by contradiction the existence of an interference threshold.
So let us assume there does not exist any finite interference threshold I 0 , then the inner limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is empty. We know that there exist a vertex solution of the linear program LP (i, I) for each interference I. Hence, either of the vertices z 
is strictly positive at odd values of indices k and strictly negative at even indices. This implies, we can find another sequence {Î k } such that f (Î k ) = 0 and I k ≤Î k ≤ I k+1 . By mean-value theorem, we can find another sequence {I * k } such that the derivative f 1 (I) of the function f (I) evaluates to zero at the values {I *
is a rational function of the variable I and can have at most |K i | real numbers I such that f 1 (I) = 0. Since the derivative f 1 (I) of the function f (I) evaluates to zero more than |K i | number of times, we have f 1 (I) = 0 for all I, and hence the function f (I) is a constant function for all interference value I. However, it can be easily seen that the function f (I) decreases to 0 as the interference I tends towards infinity, which contradicts our claim that f (I) is a constant function. Hence, there exist an in infinitely invariant optimal solution.
In the proof of theorem 7, we differentiated between the policies z (21) did not hold true. We generalize this concept now. Given any occupation measure z i of user i, we define a random variable Z i which takes snr value k i with probability z i (k i )
We refer to the distribution of this random variable as the snr distribution corresponding to the policy z i . Note that for any policy z i of user i, the time average expected reward of user i when she/he faces an interference I is equal to
where the one step reward t i (k i , I) of user i at snr k i and interference I is,
We restate condition (21) in the next theorem. The second condition of the next theorem gives a sufficient condition for verifying when two policies have the same snr distribution. The proof is provided in Appendix D. Using theorem 9 and theorem 8, we note that for any interference I larger than the threshold interference I 0 , the infinitely invariant policies give the same time average expected reward. In the next theorem, we show that the outer limit is precisely the set of all infinitely invariant optimal policies. Theorem 10. The outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is equal to the inner limit lim I→∞ S i (I) for any user i.
Proof:
We have already established in theorem 9 that the inner limit lim I→∞ S i (I) is nonempty. We shall prove the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I) contains the inner limit lim I→∞ S i (I) thus proving theorem 10. Let policy z 1 i be an infinitely invariant optimal solution and policy z 2 i belong to the outer limit lim I→∞ S i (I). Then there exist a sequence {I k } of interference terms which tends towards to infinity as k tends towards to infinity and the policy z contains policies other than the infinitely invariant policies. In the next subsection we shall show that algorithm 2 computes an infinitely invariant optimal solution.
C. Computation of an infinitely invariant optimal solution.
In the previous subsection, we defined and showed the existence of an infinitely invariant optimal solution and also proved that the outerlimit contains only these policies. In this subsection we shall show how to compute an infinitely invariant optimal solution. We shall also show that there exist only one such policy. We do so by refining the set S 1 i of 1− sensitive optimal solutions by considering the corresponding linear program LP (i, 2). Find a policy z * i of user i which minimizes,
and
We denote the set of optimal solutions of the linear program LP (i, 2) as S 2 i and any policy belonging to this set is called a 2− sensitive optimal policy. We note that by definition, any 2− sensitive optimal policy is also 1− sensitive optimal policy. The next theorem shows that the previously defined set S 2 i contains all the infinitely invariant optimal solutions. The proof is provided in Appendix E. It is to be noted that the above theorem establishes that it is sufficient to solve LP (i, 2) to compute the unique infinitely invariant optimal solution. Theorem 11 also shows that rather than solving the linear program LP (i, 2), we can use algorithm 2 to compute this policy. We note that the objective functions l 1 i (z i ) and l 2 i (z i ) can be formulated in terms of snr distribution corresponding to the policy z i as,
respectively. One now notices that the infinitely sensitive optimal policy minimizes the variance of the snr random variable Z i over all policies which maximizes the mean of the snr random variable Z i . In the next section we shall prove that under simple sufficient conditions an infinitely invariant optimal solution is the unique Nash equilibrium of the Markov game Γ n at sufficiently but finite large number of users.
VI. MARKOV GAMES AT LARGE NUMBER OF USERS
In this section, we shall prove that the infinitely invariant optimal solution is a strictly dominating policy over the set of all rational policies of the other users for any Markov game, once the number of users crosses a particular threshold. As we assume that all the users are rational, at sufficiently large number of users, the infinitely invariant optimal solution for each user is the Nash equilibrium policy of that user.
To achieve this result, we shall first characterize the set of all rational polices of each user. We shall show that the set of all policies where each user's corresponding snr random variables has a strictly positive mean contains his/her rational policies. Then we shall show that at large number of users, when all users employ rational policies, the best response of each user is to employ her/his infinitely invariant optimal solution. Recall the Markov game where each user treats interference as noise was denoted as Γ n . We note that the Markov game Γ n when the set of users is N is denoted from now on as Γ N . The set of all possible users from now on is the set of strictly positive integers Z + and any set of users N is a strict finite subset of the set Z
+ . Since we shall analyze any game with the i ′ th user in perspective, we always consider that user i belongs to the set of users N unless otherwise mentioned. We first define the idea of an Infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy for each user. It is to be noted that the existence of this sequence of policies ensures that we need to use the best response algorithm only if the cardinality of set N of users does not exceed the threshold N * . As we shall show that infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy of any user is his/her infinitely invariant optimal solution, once the number of users exceed N * , we can simply use algorithm 2 to compute the infinitely invariant optimal policy and find all the Nash equilibrium policies. As algorithm 2computes this policy in O(|H i ||P i |) steps, we can compute the Nash equilibrium policies of the Markov game in O(|N ||H i ||P i |) steps. Suppose the set N of users is strictly greater than the number N * , then with any addition of a new user, we would no longer need to recompute the equilibria policies using the best response algorithm, but rather just find the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy of the new user and adjoin this policy to the older set of equilibrium policies. This new set of policies will constitute a Nash equilibrium for the new Markov game obtained by addition of this new user. Similarly if any user leaves the system and yet the residual number of users in the system still remains greater than the threshold, we would not need to recompute the Nash equilibria of this new system, but continue using the previously computed policies. We also recall that the best response algorithm required each user to know the channel statistics of the other users. However, if an infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium exist, then this condition is no longer required and each user only needs to know his/her channel gain and channel statistics. In the next subsection we analyze the set of rational policies of each user.
A. Set of all best responses
Previously, we defined the best response set B i (z −i ) of user i as the set of all his/her policies, which maximizes his time average expected reward T i (z i , z −i ) when users other than user i use multi-policy z −i . We use this set to define the set (B i ) of all best response of user i. Definition 9. The set (B i ) of all best response of user i is the set of all policies z i of user i, such that each policy belonging to this set belongs to the best response set B i (z −i ) for some multi-policy z −i of users other than user i, for some set N of users containing user i.
It can be observed that the all the possible rational policies for any game in which that user is involved is contained in the set of all his/her best response policies. If we denote Z N −i as the set of all feasible multi policies of users other than user i, when the set N containing the number i denotes all the users in the game, then the set B i of all best responses of user i can be obtained as,
As all the users are rational, policies not in the set B i (z −i ) are not used by user i. This implies that rational user need not consider polcies in the set Z i /B i (z −i ). We summarize the result below. 
With the previous theorem in mind, we can restrict our attention to simply the policies belonging to the set B i of all best responses. Hence, we provide a important property of policies in this set. We denote M i (γ) as the set of all policies of user i, for which the corresponding snr random variable Z i has a mean which is bounded below by a strictly positive real number γ, i.e,
In the next theorem, we show that the set B i of all best responses of user i is a subset of the set M i (γ) of all policies of user i for some strictly positive real number γ. Furthermore we provide a lower bound on this real number γ. Recall that, we defined the set P i of power levels of user i as the ordered set of strictly increasing positive real numbers,
We also represent the stationary probability of user i being in channel state 0 as π i (0). 
The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix F . We call the constant γ 0,i as the interference multiple of user i. One can observe that the interference multiple γ 0,i is strictly positive if the stationary probability of user i being in channel state 0 as π i (0) is strictly less than 1. We note that this condition always holds true, as the contrapositive of this condition would imply that user i always has a channel state where he/she cannot get any strictly positive reward. In such a case user i does not need to be considered as one of the user playing the Markov game and can be neglected. Similarly the power constraint P i of user i needs to be positive which we assume is always true. We also note that from theorem 13 the average interference caused by user i when he/she employs any policy belonging to his set of all best responses is at least the interference multiple γ 0,i . In the next subsection, we show the existence of infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policies.
VII. EXISTENCE OF THE INFINITELY INVARIANT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section at large number of users, we will show that the infinitely invariant optimal policy for each user strictly dominates every other policy whenever the other users play policies from their set of all best responses. We shall then later show that the infinitely invariant optimal solution becomes the unique Nash equilibrium at large number of players. We state the next result. The proof is provided in Appendix G. One can observe in the proof of this theorem that the number N i,0 is a function of only the set of channel and power H i and P i , the interference threshold I 0,i of user i and the lower bound γ 0 . We note that the above theorem does not guarantee that the infinitely invariant optimal policy strictly dominates all policy when all the other players play arbitrarily. Indeed, if all the users other than users i do not transmit at all, then the best response of user i belongs to the set S i (0) of solutions of the linear program LP (i, 0). In general, the infinitely invariant optimal solution need not belong to the latter set and will give a strictly lower time average reward as compared to any policy in the set S i (0). However all the users being rational always transmit from their best response set and hence the previously mentioned scenario does not occur.
We note that if we can ensure that the threshold N 0,i is bounded above for all users i by some constant, then there exists an infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium. This result is in general not easy to show. However in some cases as stated next, the result is easily provable.
Proposition 1. [Finite sets of symmetric users] Suppose the set Z
+ of strictly positive integers can be partitioned into finite sets N 1 , N 2 , · · · , N k such that if user i and user j belong to some set N l , 1 ≤ l ≤ k, then both the users satisfy P i = P j , H i = H j , P i = P j and π i = π j . It is to be noted that the above assumptions ensures that the users belonging in the same partition, then they are symmetric and every optimization problem for each of the user in that partition is the same. Under the above assumption we show the uniform boundedness of the interference thresholds. Proof: First we note that under the assumptions of symmetric users, the lower bound γ 0 is strictly positive. It can also be verified by that the interference threshold I 0,i is upper bounded by max j∈Z + I j,0 . Hence the number N 0,i is the same for all users i belonging to the same partition. Hence, we have N i,0 ≤ max j∈Z + N j,0 < ∞.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present the numerical results for models with the following parameters. The largest channel index is represented by the variable r. Hence the cardinality of the set of channel states is r + 1. The total number of power levels is equal to q + 1, where the variable q represents the largest power index. We represent the set of channel states and power levels as {0, 1 r , 2 r , · · · , 1} and{0, 1, · · · , q} . We consider a Markov fading model [10] with transition probabilities as λ 0,0 = 1/2, λ 0,1 = 1/2; λ q,q−1 = 1/2, λ q,q = 1/2; λ i,i = 1/3, λ i,i+1 = 1/3, λ i,i−1 = 1/3 (1≤i≤q−1), where λ i,j represents the probability of going from state index i to state index j. N is the number of users in the system and 1 (k) is a k length row vector of all ones. Table I shows the various model parameters and the minimum number of users at which the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium becomes the equilibrium policy.
Each element of table II contains values of two stationary policies. The first policy is the Nash equilibrium policy of the first user in the models when only two users are in the system (we neglect the last five users in all models). The second policy is the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy of the first user. We observe that the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy is different from the NE policy in all the models. Indeed, more number of users are required for the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policies to become a Nash equilibrium.
To further illustrate this point, we plot in figure (1) the two norm distance between the NE policy and the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy of the first user against the total number of users in the system. We can observe from the figure that for models 1 and 2, it requires at least four users for the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy to become a Figure (1) :Plot of two norm distance between the NE policy and the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policy of the first user against the total number of users in the system. NE, while for models 3 and 4, we need at least 5 and 6 number of users respectively. Note that the model 3 and 4 differ only by user 2 and 3 having lesser power constraint. Due to this, the infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policies become NE policies only once the total number of users crosses 6.
In figure ( 2) we plot the difference of the rewards of the first user, when all users use their Nash equilibrium policies and when all users use their infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policies, against the number of users. As mentioned in table (I) and seen in figure (1) , we see that the rewards of the users have become the same, once the total number of users crosses the integer N * . Figure (2): Plot of the difference of the rewards of the first user, when all users use their Nash equilibrium policies and when all users use their infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium policies, against the number of users.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.
A. Proof of Theorem 3, part (1)
Proof: The Markov game Γ is a potential game, then from definition 2 there exist a function T : Z → R, such that for
for all multi-policy z −i of all users other than user i and for any pair of policies (z i ,ẑ i ) of user i. It can now be observed in the best response algorithm, for each index k,
We first prove that the algorithm terminates. To do so, assume the contrary, then for any index k, we have z(k) = z(k + 1).
Since by assumption, the best response policy of each user i computed in the algorithm is a vertex of the polyhedron, from finiteness of the vertices of each polyhedron Z i , we have that the sequence {z(k)} can only take values from a finite set. This implies there exist at least two indices k < j such that, z(k) = z(j). Without loss of generality (WLOG), assume that k, j are the smallest indices which satisfy the latter property. Thus we have from (23),
In particular all inequalities in (23) hold with equality for the index k. As the best response algorithm ensures for all users i,
we have z(k) = z(k + 1). This clearly contradicts our assumption.
We have shown there exist a index k such that z(k) = z(k+ 1). Assume it its the smallest such index. Now we have from (23) , T (z(k)) = T (z (k + 1) ). In particular, all inequalities in (23) hold with equality for index k. Hence, z(k) is a CNE.
B. Proof of Theorem 3, part (2)
Proof: We first show that the sequence {T (z(k))} converges to a finite number. Calculation (23) shows that the sequence {T (z(k))} either converges to a finite real number or infinity. Denote this limit by T * . Let z * be a limit point of the sequence z(k) generated by the best response algorithm and let z(k m ) be the subsequence that converges to z * . As the function T is continous, the sequence T (z(k m )) converges to T (z * ). As the set Z is compact, by Weierstrass theorem sup{T (z) : z ∈ Z} is finite. Since z * ∈ Z as the set Z is closed, it follows that T (z * ) < ∞. As the sequence {T (z(k))} converges to T * = T (z * ) which is finite. We now prove that the algorithm will terminate. suppose not, then for each index k, we have for some user i,
we have from calculation (23) that the number T * = ∞. This contradicts our previous proof of the statement that number T * < ∞. Hence the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate. Let k be the smallest index such that for all users i, we have
It can now be verified that z(k) is a ǫ− CNE.
C. Proof of Theorem 3, part (2)
We first show that the sequence {T (z(k))} converges to a finite number. Calculation (23) shows that the sequence {T (z(k))} either converges to a finite real number or infinity. Denote this limit by T * . Let z * be a limit point of the sequence z(k) generated by the best response algorithm and let z(k m ) be the subsequence that converges to z * . As the function T is continous, the sequence T (z(k m )) converges to T (z * ). As the set Z is compact, by Weierstrass theorem sup{T (z) : z ∈ Z} is finite. Since z * ∈ Z as the set Z is closed, it follows that T (z * ) < ∞. As the sequence {T (z(k))} converges to T * = T (z * ) which is finite. We now prove that the algorithm will terminate. suppose not, then for each index k, we have for some user i,
It can now be verified that z(k) is a ǫ− CNE. APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 6. We first prove a simple lemma which states that any optimal policy to the linear program LP (i, 1) will either ensure that the user transmits with peak power, or the average power utilized by this policy will be equal to the average power constraint. 
Consider the policyẑ i such that
The reader can now verify the following,
Hence by contradiction z * i cannot be optimal. We now use the above lemma to complete the proof of theorem 6. The reader is asked to prove theorem 6 using lemma 1 under the condition p i ≥ r x=1 π(h x i )p q i on the average power constraint of user i. We consider the case where this condition does not hold true.
Proof: Assume that z * i be a 1−sensitive optimal policy. Then by lemma 1, we know that p i (z i ) = P i > 0. We first consider the case that for some channel state
We will show this is not possible. We first observe that,
We note that if the above set of inequalities hold with equalities, then z i (p q i , h
, which contradicts our assumption. So we assume that,
This implies that there exist a channel indexx < x * such that for some index a * , such that p
where the constants ǫ i > 0 and ǫ 2 > 0 satisfies ǫ i ·p
It also follows that
Hence we have exhibited a policyẑ i that strictly performs better than the optimal policy z * i . Therefore, by contradiction, we have for the optimal policy z * (25) where the last inequality follows from,
One can get equalities in the expressions (25) if the optimal policy z * i is such that
In such a case, one can verify that the policy z * i belongs to the set Q i . This proves that the set of 1−sensitive optimal solutions S 1 i is a subset of the set of structural results Q i . To prove the converse, observe that for any two distinct solutions z 1 i and z 2 i belonging to the structural results Q i , we have l
, hence, all policies in the set Q i are 1−sensitive optimal policies.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 8
We first prove a result which is used to prove theorem 8.
where k l are the distinct non zero snr terms in the set K i and
Proof: Recall that, the one step reward
We prove the result by contradiction. Suppose the matrix M i is not invertible, then we can find real numbers α(j), 1 ≤ j ≤ |K i | − 1, not all of them zero, such that for all non zero snr values
Let us consider the function
Hence the function f (x) is zero at all points x ∈ K i . By the mean value theorem, we have the derivative f 1 of the function f is zero at |K i | − 1 distinct real numbers. However the derivative of f (x) is'
.
Clearly the derivative is a rational function and can have at most |K i | − 2 real numbers x where f 1 (x) evaluates to zero. Hence f 1 (x) = 0 for all real numbers x, therefore f (x) is a constant function. However the function f (x) is zero at x = 0 and nonzero at any x strictly positive if the numbers α(j) are not all zero. Hence by contradiction, the real numbers α(j) are all zero for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |K i | − 1. Hence the matrix M i is invertible.
We now prove theorem 8. 
This proves the first part of theorem 8. Now suppose the time average expected reward of user i evaluated at the two polices are the same for
belongs to the null set of the transpose of the matrix M i . As the matrix M i is invertible by the previous lemma, we have for all snr terms k l ∈ K i /{0}, z
. This implies that the two snr distribution are the same proving the second part of theorem 8.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Proof: Let E(Z i ) = {z 
). To prove this claim, assume the result is not true, then we can find at least
for all these values of interference.
However by theorem 8 part (2), we have that the two snr distributions are equal, i.e z k i = z 
). We can now see that for all interference The following lemma is required for the proof of theorem 11. Then the unique probability distribution {α(j) : 0 ≤ j ≤ |P i |} which minimizes,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ p q i , is the probability distribution
Proof: We first note that if X is a real valued random variable such that it lies between two real number a and b, then
To prove this claim observe that V ar(X) ≤ E(X − c) 2 for all real numbers c, by choosing c = and using the fact that the random variable X lies between a and b almost surely, the result follows. Note that if we denote X α to be the random variable that takes values in the set P i with probability distribution α(·), then the linear program in lemma 3 can be restated as, finding a random variable X α with distribution α(·) which minimizes,
where the set S α denotes the set of random variables X α that takes values in the set P i with probability distribution α(·) and has mean α, i.e. E(X α ) = α. Let us denote a α and b α as the numbers belonging to the set P i such that the random variable X α with distribution α(·) lies almost surely between a α and b α . Assume a α < a α , then we have from 27,
One can easily show that the right hand side in the above expression is minimized when a α = ⌊α⌋ and b α = ⌊α⌋ + 1.
The distribution α(·) which minimizes the left hand side in the above expression can now be evaluated to be the distribution stated in lemma 3.
We now provide the of theorem 11.
A. Proof of theorem 11
Proof: We have already established from theorem 5 and theorem 10 that any infinitely invariant optimal solution is 1−sensitive optimal. Let z 1 i be an infinitely invariant optimal solution and z 2 i be any other 1−sensitive optimal policy. Then, for any interference I greater than interference threshold I 0 ,
At sufficiently large interference I, we have
As both policies z 
Multiplying the above expression by I 2 and letting I tend toward infinity, we have
Hence the infinitely invariant optimal solution is also 2−sensitive optimal. Define the index k * such that,
By theorem 6 we know that for any 1−sensitive optimal policy, we have for channel indices k > k * the policy z i satisfies
). Hence any policy z i which is 2−sensitive optimal minimizes,
over all policies z i in the set S 1 i of 1−sensitive optimal policies. Hence any such policy z i minimizes,
Using lemma 3, the 2−sensitive optimal policy z i satisfies
where the index a itself satisfies,
The uniqueness of this solution follows from lemma 3 and theorem 6. The reader can verifying the correctness of algorithm 2 by checking that it computes the unique 2−sensitive optimal policy.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 13
We first characterize the set B i of all best responses of user i. The first lemma shows that set is a compact set. Proof: Recall that that set B i of all best responses of user i, was defined as,
where Z N −i denotes the the set of all feasible multi-policies of users other than user i, when the set N containing the number i denotes the set of all users in the game Γ N . Let C(Z i ) denote the class of all the subsets of the set Z i , which are obtained as convex closure of finitely many vertices of the polyhedron Z i . As the vertices of the polyhedron Z i is finite, we have the class C(Z i ) itself as finite. We note that the set B i (z −i ) contains all the best response policies of user i, when users other than user i play multi-policy z −i . As this set contains all the set of solutions of a linear program, we have that this set is the convex closure of finitely many points, each point being a vertex of the set Z i of feasible occupation measures of user i. This implies that the best response set B i (z −i ) belongs to the class C(Z i ) for each multi-policy z −i of users other than user i. As the class C(Z i ) is finite, we have that the set B i is a finite union of compact sets. Hence B i is compact.
We now define the set M * i (0) as the set of all policies of user i, for which the corresponding snr random variable Z i has a mean strictly greater than zero, i.e,
The next lemma shows that that set B i of all best responses is a subset of the previously defined set.
Lemma 5. The set B i is a subset of the set M * i (0) of the set of all policies of user i, for which the corresponding snr random variable Z i has a mean strictly greater than zero.
and only if x = 0 or x = 0, a = 0. This implies that the average reward T i (z i , z −i ) at policy z i is equal to 0. Consider the policy z * i of user i which satisfies,
Note that the above policy allows user i to only transmit whenever her/his channel gain is the best, i.e., x = q. It can be easily verified that P i (z * i ) = P i , hence the policy is feasible and that the average reward obtained at this policy
The next lemma shows that any policy belonging to the set B i of all best responses of user i will either ensure that the user transmits with peak power whenever her/his channel gain is strictly positive or the expected time average power utilized by this policy is equal to the average power constraint P i . 
However if
, then the expected average power constraint p i (z * i ) under the policy z * i is equal to P i . Also, the optimal policy z * i satisfies z * i (0, 0) = π i (0). The proof is similar to proof of lemma 1 in Appendix B and hence omitted. We now give proof of theorem 13
Proof: Consider the function f : Z i :→ R defined as,
Note that the function f (z i ) is the expected value of the snr random variable Z i corresponding to the occupation measure z i of user i. As the set B i of all best responses of user i is a compact set (Lemma 4 ) and the function f (z i ) is continuous, by Weierstrass theorem , there exist a policy z * i ∈ B i such that,
As the policy z * i ∈ B i , by lemma 5, we have f (z * i ) > 0, hence we choose the interference multiple γ i,0 = f (z * i ). Then we have the set B i of all best responses is subset of the set M i (γ i,0 ) of all policies of user i for which the corresponding snr random variable Z i has mean at least γ i,0 . We will now complete the proof by providing the lower bound on the interference multiple γ i,0 . Consider first the case that the power constraint P i of user i satisfies,
Then by lemma 6, all the policies in the set B i of all best responses ensure that user i transmits with peak power p q i whenever her/his channel gain is strictly positive. In this case we have for all policies z i ∈ B i , the function f (z i ) satisfies,
On the other hand if the condition 29 does not hold true, then by lemma 6, we have for every policy z i in the set B i of all best responses satisfies z i (0, 0) = π(0). Also by lemma 6 every policy z i in the set satisfies P i (z i ) = P i . As the set B i of all best responses is a subset of the set Z i of all feasible policies, we have,
, where the set Z * i is described as,
It can now be verified that in this case, f (z * i ) > h 1 i P i . Hence we have that the interference multiple γ i,0 for user i satisfies,
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 14
In this appendix, for a finite set N of users containing user i, and other users j ∈ N /{i} using policy z j , we denote the expected time average reward of user i and immediate reward of user i at channel state-power action pair
. These changes make explicit the dependence of these functions on the set N which will be varying in this appendix. As the proof of the theorem 14 is involved, we first provide a brief outline of the argument. Let policy z j of user j = i belong to his/her set B j of all best responses. Let z i and z * i denote any policy and the infinitely sensitive optimal policy of user i. We first show that there exist a natural number N 0,i (z i ) depending upon the policy z i of user i, such that for all sets N of users satisfying |N | ≥ N 0,i (z i ), the difference between the expected time average rewards when user i employs his/her infinitely sensitive optimal policy z * i and policy z i is strictly positive, i.e., for all
To show this result, we first observe the above expression can be expressed as,
We divide the above expression into two terms at sufficiently large number of users depending on the condition that the sum j =i Z j of the snr random variables j = i corresponding to the policies z j , exceeds the interference threshold I 0,i of user i, i.e.,
, and
The idea behind the above breakup comes from two observations. The first observation is that for all interference I greater than I 0,i , the infinitely sensitive optimal policy z i is the optimal solutions of the linear program LP (i, I) and hence the term B(z * i , z i , N ) will be strictly positive. The other observation comes from theorem 13, that when all users other than user i use policies from their set of best response policies, they will always transmit, causing interference of at least γ j,0 . By ensuring that the interference multiple γ j,0 greater than some strictly positive constant γ 0 , we ensure that the sum j =i Z j will eventually exceed the interference threshold I 0,i . By using Hoeffding inequality and this second observation, we will show that the term A(z * i , z i , N ) can be made arbitrary small. Eventually at large number of users, the term A(z * i , z i , N ) will become much smaller than the term B(z * i , z i , N ), and hence their sum will become positive. Rigorously, we will show that, , where l ∈ {0, 1} depending upon the policy z i of user i. If the policy z i is not 1−sensitive optimal, then l = 0 otherwise l = 1. One can now easily observe the existence of the number N 0,i (z i ). The functions β l+1 (z i , z * i ) of the policies z i and z * i will be shown to strictly positive for each l ∈ {0, 1}. Then to complete the proof, we observe that for all sets N of users satisfying |N | ≥ max{N 0,i (z i ) : z i ∈ E i (Z i )} where E i (Z i ) is the set of all vertices of the polyhedron Z i , we have for all policies z j ∈ B j , j ∈ N /{i}, for all policies z i ∈ Z i ,
We state some definitions and lemmas required to prove this theorem. These definitions and theorems convert the tedious calculations involved in this proof in terms of the snr random variables which are more easier to handle. Recall that the snr distribution of the snr random variable Z i of user i corresponding to the policy z i was given as z i (k i ) = Pr(Z i = k i ) = (hi,pi)∈Ki(ki) z i (h i , p i ).
The set K i (k i ) was defined as
and the snr random variable Z i takes values in the set K i of possible distinct snr values. Given policies z i of each user i belonging to the finite set N of users, and the corresponding snr random variables Z i , we define, 1) The immediate reward of user i at snr k i when users {j ∈ N , j = i} has snr random variables Z j as,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the snr distributions of the random variables Z j , j = i.
2) The expected time average reward of user i, when every user {j ∈ N } has snr random variables Z j as,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the snr distribution of the random variables Z i . The next lemma shows that the above definitions are just another way of stating the previously defined immediate reward and The expected time average reward of user i when all users j ∈ N use policy z j . Here the function t i (h, p) is the immediate reward of user i, when the signals from the other users is treated as noise, i.e., t i (h, p) = log 2 1 + h i p i N 0 + j =i h j p j .
One can represent the immediate reward R z−i i (h i , p i , N ) as
where each expectation is successively taken with respect to the policy {z j , j = i}, from j = 1 to |N |. Recall also that the snr random variable Z j takes value k j = h j p j with probability
where the set K j (k j ) = {(h j , p j ) : h j p j = k j }. One can now show that the expression (32) is equal to
where each expectation is successively taken with respect to the distribution of the snr random variable {Z j , j = i}, from j = 1 to |N |. Hence we have,
The expected time average reward of user i at policy z i when other users use multipolicy z −i is, Using lemma 8, we get the desired result.
The next lemma provides bounds on partial sums of alternating series. ln(1 + x) in the interval x ∈ (−1, 1). The proof of this lemma is given in theorem 8.16 [29] . Then for each integer n ∈ N,
We use the above lemma to prove a technical result required to prove theorem 14. We now write the term B(z i , z * i , N ) as sum of two terms and provide lower bounds on each of them. This breakup depends upon whether the policy z i is 1− sensitive optimal or not. If the policy z i is not 1− sensitive optimal, then set l = 0, otherwise l = 1. Using lemma 11 and the fact that the indicator function is bounded above by 1, we have
Using lemma 8 and the properties that k i ≤ k and E[Z j ] ≥ γ 0 , we have Observing that the random variable Z j ≤ k for all users j, we have from 8, we have
